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Philosophising by Accident
BERNARD STIEGLER
My becoming-a-philosopher through acting [en acte], if it has taken place, and I
believe indeed it has taken place, was the effect of an anamnesis produced by an
objective situation in the accidental course of my existence. The accident consist-
ed in five years of incarceration which I spent in the Saint-Michel prison in
Toulouse, then in the Muret detention centre, between 1978 and 1983-years
obviously preceded by a passage to the act, that is, by a transgression.
So, these were five years spent in philosophical practice, in experimental phe-
nomenology, and in passage to the limits of phenomenology, following this "pas-
sage to the act" which itself had absolutely nothing to do with philosophy.
One must always be ready to philosophise to the death, as did Socrates, and to
philosophise in that dyina which a life is-but "a life" means here an existence and
a facticity, an accidentality. For example, Socrates's being condemned to death is
an accident which is necessary [qu'iljaut]: Socrates will make sure lfaire en sone] that
it is necessary, he will make a mistake [un difaut] that he will hal'e had to make. The
philosophical vocation, if there is one, gives itself, as in Proust, in the future
anterior of an apres-coup, as endurance of the apres-coup.
The apres-coup traverses and structures what those five years in prison were
for me-but also the following twenty years, which have led me today before you
as bifore the law, years I have consecrated to consolidating this "necessity" ["iljaut'l,
this mistake which will have had to happen.
But, at the same time, this question of vocation is that of a vocation by default
[par difaut], or by accident, because this vocation is always that if everyone [celle de
tous], with "everyone" forming the we that the philosopher through acting represents
in individuating-by default.
Like aflyinafish
My incarceration in Saint Michel prison, result of a passage to the act, will have
been the suspension of my acts and the interruption of my actions: such is the
function of prison. But interruption and suspension, which are also the beginning of
philosophy (Socrates's daimon is thus the one who interrupts), were for myself the
occasion of a reflection on what is the passaae to the act in aeneral-and a recollec-
tion of all the acts which brouaht me there.
Twenty years after my liberation it seems to me, moreover, that my journey
will never cease to be a circuit between "action" ["action'1 and its suspension by
"philosophy in action" ["philosophie en acte'1, between writing and highly social activity.
It would be necessary here to examine the ambiguities of the relation
between these words, act and action [acte et action], with all the problems posed by
the translation into Latin actus of the Greek eneraeia.
It is Aristotle who forms this couple of act and potential with which I have
tried on this very day to think my own life-but which I discovered almost
twenty-five years ago, in Hegel's History ifPhilosophy, where he reformulates, in
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his commentary on On the Soul, the Aristotelian question of dunamis and energeia as
the question of the in-itself and the for-itself.
In that treatise Aristotle poses three types of souls, according to three modes
of animation, three kinds of living movement: the vegetative, sensory, and intellec-
tive souls, which form three relations to the "immovable prime mover," to God as
the desirable par excellence, as the motive [motif] and in that sense the reason of
everything that moves. Aristotle explains that a sensory soul, for example, is most
of the time sensory in potential, and not in acting [en acte]. It is only sensory
through acting when it reproduces itself. The rest of the time, it remains in the irife-
rior mode of the vegetative soul, which Aristotle also calls nutritive. The same
applies to the intellective or noetic soul: it is only rarely in action [en acte] and
remains most of the time in the sensory mode. It is in action [en acte] only when,
participating in the divine, it re-produces the truth. This is what leads Hegel to say
that the sensory soul is the in-itself of the intellective soul and, in a way, its mate-
rial. The intellective soul is most of the time only in potentiality, and not in action
[en acte], meaning that it comports itself sensitively rather than intellectively.
This account [constat]' and the lesson it names, will have guided all my solitary
work. Since the time of my imprisonment-the question becoming that of the
conditions of the passage from potential to act, what Aristotle names participation in
the divine. In this regard, the reading in On the Soul was decisive for thinking
movement, motion, and what one might call emotion as desire, that is, the rela-
tion to the immovable prime mover, insofar as, for such a passagefrom potential to
act, the consideration of milieu appeared to me to be decisive.
Studying the senses, Aristotle underlines in effect that one does not see that,
in the case of touching, it is the body which forms the milieu, whereas, for exam-
ple, in the case of sight, the milieu is what he calls the diaphane [the transparent].
And he specifies that this milieu, because it is that which is most close, is that which
is structurallyforgotten just as water is for a fish. The milieu is forgotten, because it
effaces itself before that to which it gives place. There is always already a milieu, but
this fact escapes us in the same way that "aquatic animals," as Aristotle says, "do not
notice that one wet body touches another wet body" (423ab): water is that which
the fish always sees; it is that which it never sees. Or, as Plato too says in the Timaeus,
if the world was made of gold, gold would be the sole being that would never be
seen-it would not be a being, but the inapparent being if that being, appearing
only in the occurrence of a being, by difault [par defaut].
Aristotle does not examine in this treatise the noetic milieu (the intellective
milieu), giving place to logos (he does this, on the other hand, in the Analytics: such
is his logiC). Reading Aristotle, it is this same possibility of the existence of such a
noetic milieu, as the element of the everyday life of the intellective soul, on which
I meditated a great deal in my cell, where I was like afish out ifwater. There ought
to be a milieu of the intellective soul, I thought, just as the senses of the sensory
soul have their milieus.
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Now, it appeared to me that this milieu was that of language. I set myself to
reading Saussure and Wittgenstein. Later the milieu became for me that of the
artifact, of the supplement in general, of which language (where it produces the
very quotidian experience of logos) would be one dimension, but of which techni-
cal artifacts (consisting of things) would form another dimension.
From then on, philosophy consisted of considering the milieu while being
able to extract oneself from it, in the same way as a flying fish can leave the water:
intermittently. In this extraction, or abstraction, the milieu is brought into view
in its absence [par dijaut]' that is, here, grabbed hold Ij'[toucher du doigt] like a wall,
as the condition of passage from the potential of the intellective soul to its act, to
its jor itself. From then on, I could not claim that I was in my cell like a fish in
water, but, in that cell, where I had been rendered radically deficient in the vital
milieu Ij'the intellective soul, the world, as thefiamework Ij'artifactsjorming relations sus-
taining [supportant] social relations, I had perhaps a chance to consider this world
as does a fish flying above its element~an elementary milieu totally constituted by
supplements, where the element, in other words, is always lacking [faire toujours
defaut].
So, I discovered~and I say this in Platonic terms, but from a point of view
that opposes me to Plato~thatthis element was the hypomnesis, as that which gives
place to anamnesis.
Hypomnesis and mortality
Regarding anamnesis, let us recall a scene from Meno. Socrates meets Meno, who
is on his way to the house of Protagoras to be taught virtue. Socrates proposes to
him that he first of all ask what virtue is jor himself, in order to know if it is truly
possible to teach it. To this question of knowing what virtue is, Meno responds by
proposing examples of various virtues. Socrates tells him this is not answering the
question of knowing what virtue is as such: not through such and such particular
virtue, but virtue as forming the unity of all possible virtues, or the reason of the
saies of cases which form the examples, the unity of this series, thus the essence
of virtue, that is, the origin of virtue (that through which it commences). It is then
that Meno responds with his famous aporia, whereby Socrates cannot find what he
is looking for, because either he does not know it [connai't pas], and so he will not
recognise [re-connai'tra pas] it if he finds it, or because he already knows it, in which
case he is only pretending to search for it. Socrates responds that in effect he already
knew what he was looking for: he knew it at "another time," then hej0180t it. From
then on, cognition is recognition [Ia connaissance est une reconnaissance], a remem-
bering: an anamnesis.
Phaedrus, as a dogmatic reprise of Meno, and a simplification of the meaning of
the survival of Socrates in death, on the one hand founds the discourse on the
immortality of the soul, in condemning the body as ajall jrom the origin, a prison of
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the soul, site of passion and cause ifforBettinB by the soul of its knowledge of the
origin, and, on the other hand, opposes anamnesis to hypomnesis: the latter, as a tech-
nics if memOlj (and he is concerned here essentially with the writing of books),
with the same flaws [difauts] as the body, and in the same way a prison, is for Plato
what renders the soulforBeiful, replacing true memory with artiflcial memory, and
accentuates the forBettinB if the oriBin into which the soul has fallen in its descent
into the body.
Hypomnesis is here, very generally, the figure of artifice, of technics as the
dead simulacrum of life-as-immortality. Now, in a much earlier dialogue, Plato
had Protagoras undertake a discourse on prostheticity in general and on the flaws
tau difaut] of the body, and, through it, of mortals and of mortality properly speak-
ing-of which Protagoras (in the dialogue which bears his name) proposes a gen-
esis, which is also that of thefundamentally accidental character of mortals, fruits of
a mistake by the Titans, an accident proceeding precisely from a f0l8ettinB: Zeus,
having asked Prometheus to bring into the day the living beings which are not
immortals, handed him all the qualities, the dunameis, to distribute to the living.
Epimetheus, who is charged with this distribution,jorBets to save a quality for man,
for which Prometheus tries to compensate by stealinB fire, that is, technics-a
theft which is a passage to the act, an attempt, in vain, to make up for the lack
[difaut] of a quality, in other words the difault iforiBin, which from then on afflicts
we mortals.
This accidental forgetting, generator of prostheses and artifices making up for
a lack of origin, is equally the origin of hypomnesis, to which Plato will later oppose
the anamnesis of the origin. In opposition to the metaphysics arising in the Phaedrus,
the myth of the fault of Epimetheus says that at the oriBin there is only an oriBinary
difault iforiBin, and man, without qualities, only exists by difault: he becomes.
The extra-ordinQlY in the absence ifworld
A passage to the act plunged me accidentally into a profoundly philosophical situ-
ation, which was in its turn a passage from the potential to the act-a reminis-
cence through interruption of the action and suspension of the conditions of ordi-
nary life. This was the beginning of an experience of the extra-ordinQlY. I believe
the experience of the extra-ordinary is essential to philosophy: it is the meaning
of Socrates's shamanism, of his famous daimon. It is also the reversal of the natural
attitude in Husserl's phenomenology. For five years I had this experience of the
extra-ordinary because I was confronted with the limits of the conditions of intel-
lective life, being held above the ordinary social surface of those conditions. I
almost grabbed hold of the extra-ordinary, as an ordinarily invisible milieu sud-
denly considered as such-but in the night of my ignorance, groping, it appeared
to me to constitute those conditions of experience that cannot be found in expe-
rience, because they condition it. 1
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Deprived of an "exterior milieu," my "interior milieu" takes on that incom-
mensurable depth and weight sought after by mystics and, more generally, by asce-
tics. But it is also and just as much in its absence, and in the most intimate and secret
hollow [creux] of the "interior milieu," that the "exterior milieu" is constituted as
irreducible-and thus I was testing a Husserlian lesson2 but, as we will see, a con-
trario. 3 Absent, the world reigned in my cloister like "the absence of all bouquets."4
After a few months of incarceration I had written, above the small table where I
worked and ate, this verse by Mallarme:
On no fruits here does my hunger feast,
But finds in their learned lack the self-same taste. 5
As the days passed, I was discovering there is no interior milieu, but only,
remaining here, in my cell, the remains, the defaults, the artifices of which the
world consists, and through which it finds its consistency. I no longer lived in the
world, but in the absence of a world, which presented itself here not only as a
default, but as that which is alwap in default, and as a necessary difault [un difaut
qu'ilJaut]-rather than as a lack [manque].
And, inversely,Jor want ifthese remains prodUCing a difault, there had been noth-
ing else: I was woven only out of these remains.
Because, finally, the exterior milieu being interrupted and suspended, being
in default, in reality there was for me no interior milieu, but rather its reduction to
an exterior milieu itselfreduced to an absolute minimum of that which remained of it in
my memory, constituting my interminable recollection via the fabric of my mem-
ories-what Husserl called secondary retentions-and which would become for
me not only the material of a desperate recollection, but also of an anamnesis, of a
work of reminiscence, in the properly philosophical sense of the word.
Myfreedom, hypomneses and the necessity if the world
From these remains of the world, I gathered material for a reminiscence of the
necessity of the world-and, in fact, of its properly irreducible character. This was
certainly a reminiscence, or a reactivation from out of those remains, but, some-
what like Husserl's analysis of the origin of geometry, this reactivation of the
world was not possible other than via the intermediary rf that which would permit me
in a way to represent [figurer] this world ideally, as for example Meno's slave repre-
sents the geometric ideal in the sand: by relying on the hypomneses ifbooks read and
words written.
Because the world in which the exterior milieu consisted had not complete-
ly disappeared in its I'ery exteriority (or I would have gone mad): I reconstituted it, each
day, through what I would much later name tertiQ1Y retentions,6 that is, through
hypomnesic traces.
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This exteriority was irreducible, which means I could not reach (myself in) it
Ue ne pouvais pas m'en passer] (the interior is nothing without the exterior, the dif-
ference between the two being an illusion-obviously necessary, and even insur-
mountable), but it was within my power to reconstitute it. Such were my free-
dom, my intimacy, and my secret.
Very quickly, I had the presence of spirit to begin to read and write, secret-
ing around me an intimate hypomnesic milieu (which was nevertheless already on
the way to becoming public), at once secret, cryptic, and yet already publishable: I
constituted a world which would become, over the years, and beyond the period
of my incarceration, my philosophy.
If this had not happened, I would have become insane or totally asocial.
Because if we are constituted by retentions which remain within us in the absence
of the world, these retentions produce protentions which are the desires for
actions, actual forms of being-in-the-world. I had found the way to suspend these
protentions, because I had transferred them to my unceasing effort to consider the
element while being myself maintained outside of it-through fabricating that
other element which was in the process of becoming "my philosophy," a pure fab-
ric of hypomneses, of which I daily deposited traces on paper, like a snail sliming
along a wall.
TheJraBility cifJreedom
Prison is asceticism without end [sans arret]-with the exception of micro-inter-
ruptions such as visits and, when the time comes, day-release. I ended up being
afraid of (while also desiring) these micro-interruptions to the silence of which
asceticism consists. I avoided even, as much as possible, the "promenades" which
broke the silence I had learned to love. When one begins to systematically prac-
tice the experience of one's pre-individuallived milieu (having become accessible
to oneself beyond the context of the world), as an almost palpable milieu (a little
like the way in which a hand placed outside the window during high-speed driv-
ing causes air to be perceived as a liquid), having thus totally suspended all rela-
tion to a meaningful milieu other than that which one carries and reactivates with-
in oneself, or other than that towards which one deliberately heads (such as the
book one reads, or rather devours, or the book one writes)-now then, if one is
all of a sudden confronted with micro-interruptions to this asceticism, then, par-
adoxically, one suffers terribly: one discovers that, in fact, to be "free" is a suffer-
ing. It is suffering because, most of the time, it is produced not as liberty but, pre-
cisely, as alienation. One perceives with astonishment that, in that cell, one is
much more free, or at least that liberty is much more accessible there, much purer,
appearing then essentially as JraBility, as what is intrinsically fragile, that which
must be made the object of the whole of one's care, of a veritable cult, of a cul-
ture. This culture, which I have named, after Epictetus, my melete.
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The silence out ifwhich a voice arises
My melete was in reality an ensemble of disciplines.
I would, for example, throughout those five years, begin each day by reading
Mallarme-I arose as soon as I awoke, to avoid those uncontrollable protentions
which would occur as the waking reveries of the morning. Reading a poem, or
reading and re-reading a prose text, usually for half an hour, not so as to learn it
by heart, but to understand it.
More generally, my melete came from readings leading to prolonged writing
exercises in different modes, which came to form veritable reading-methods,
which consisted in a process in which the texts read were catalogued, then trans-
formed into commentaries, and finally consisted of writing, in which these
remains of the world were reassembled: thus was produced reminiscence.
In the evening, I read novels.
I lived only in language, and uniquely in written language. I spoke only very
rarely. I did not like it; I didn't like it anymore. I had learnt to love the silence
through which I could listen to what always arose so long as I knew how to wait:
an other voice, a soliloquy in which it was not myself who was speaking, but the
other me, which I called myself-an-other [moi-l'autre], the other if myself, the
other which I carried in me, which I became, as if I had been weighed down with
what Socrates had ascribed as the task of the maieutician.
Language, in abandoning its communicative function, opened itself fully to its
significance, or rather as significance, as if it turned itself over to its vocation of
signifying, suddenly proliferating. It made sians, literally, sometimes to the point of
madness. I listened and tried to take note of everything I heard or read. It hap-
pened with an absolute necessity. It signified, almost as if it spoke by itself, and,
from that point of view, I am obviously tempted to speak of "vocation": it resem-
bled that which the tradition considers to be that of which a vocation consists. It
was a matter of a voice (vocare).
This impersonal voice, which was not the language of communication, was
the language of pure significance of which Blanchot spoke regarding Char in The
Beast ifLascaux.
When that language began to "speak," to signify, I had the feeling of entering
into a state of extra-lucidity. It was a kind of passion, and it was in these excep-
tional conditions that I encountered the Greek passion for language and the ques-
tion of loaos which arises there, a passion and a question which were also a state of
exception and an origin: ours, insofar as we philosophise today, in potential or in
act. But I came to the position that this originary Greek passion was, as well, a
default of origin-as Husserl glimpsed at the end of his life, it was hypomnesically
constituted by default, by this default which the hypomnesic technique of writing is.
Much later, I compared my position with Husserl's thoughts on soliloquy in
Loaicallnvestiaations. But I did this on the basis of frequent preparatory readings of
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Plato and his discourse on dianoia, dialectic as the dialogue of the soul with itself,
in a context where, for me-rigorously experimenting with dianoia, understand-
ing it in order to criticise dialectic as Plato wanted to establish it-it was first cif
all a matter ciffighting against the bad soliloquy: the hell lived by those who, as one
says, talk to themselves, those whom one sees everywhere these days in the
streets, those who have lost their spirit, overcome by the harshness of life.
This was, then, how I undertook to practice philosophy, as the experience of
a silence in which a voice arose, as a soliloquy sustained by the hypomneses of
writing, anamnesically reconstituting language as that which does not allow itself
to be understood except through the trial of a cloistered asceticism and an
absolute solitude, language which is rarely produced in the dialogue between two,
in the social dialectic, which unfortunately almost always becomes, today pure
chatter, if not a system of cretinisation.
In that soliloquy of extremities, on the verge of talking to myself, but just
before that point, on the edge of that quasi-madness of extreme thoughts, of final
ends and profound roots, the hypomnesis was my se!feguaTd [gaTdejou].
Excerpt from an unpublished translation of Stiegler's book Posser aI'oete (Galilee, 2003). Translation
by David Barison, Daniel Ross, and Patrick Crogan.
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NOTES
1 They are not found in experience, but rather in extraordinmy experiences and at the limit of the social-as
that which delimits the social, practices which suspend the ordinary-whether these are experiences of
religious life, of thought, of painting (such is the extra-ordinariness of Mount Saint-Victoire), of listening,
of dance, of writing, music, literature, etc.-each forming as many modalities of flight beyond the element.
2 The lesson in question concerns Husserl's claim that the possibility of the world is constituted by the
Transcendental Ego.
3 My counter argument is that the hypomnesic supplementarity of the world is constitutive, and that this
world, as accidental facticity, is therefore irreducible.
4 Stephane Mallarme, Coup de Des, Deul'Tes completes, ed. Henri Mondor & G. Jean-Aubry (Paris: Gallimard,
1945),368.
5 Stephane Mallarme, Collected Poems, trans. Henry Weinfield (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1994),84; Mallarme, Deuvres completes, 76.
6 I developed this concept, in relation to the Husserlian concepts of primary and secondary retention, in
Technics and Time 1: The Faulr of Epimetheus (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), part 2, ch. 3; La
Technique et le Temps 2. Les desoJ·ientation (Paris: Galilee, 1996), ch. 4; and La Technique et le Temps 3, chs. 1-2.
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